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 1 
The necessary contradictions of ‘community-led’ health 
promotion: A case study of HIV prevention in an Indian red 
light district 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Health promotion interventions with marginalised groups are increasingly 
expected to demonstrate genuine community participation in their design and 
delivery. However, ideals of egalitarian democratic participation are far 
removed from the starting point of the hierarchical and exploitative social 
relations that typically characterise marginalised communities. What scope is 
there for health promotion projects to implement ideals of community 
leadership within the realities of marginalisation and inequality? We examine 
how the Sonagachi Project, a successful sex-worker-led HIV prevention 
project in India, has engaged with the unequal social relations in which it is 
embedded. Our ethnographic study is based on observation of the Project’s 
participatory activities and 39 interviews with a range of its stakeholders 
(including sex worker employees of the Project, non-sex-worker development 
professionals, brothel managers, sex workers’ clients). The analysis shows 
that the Project is deeply shaped by its relationships with non-sex-worker 
interest groups. In order to be permitted access to the red light district, it has 
had to accommodate the interests of local men’s clubs and brothel managers. 
The economic and organisational capacity to run such a project has 
depended upon the directive input of development professionals and funding 
agencies. Thus, the ‘community’ that leads this project is much wider than a 
local grouping of marginalised sex workers. We argue that, given existing 
power relations, the engagement with other interest groups was necessary to 
the project’s success. Moreover, as the Project has developed, sex workers’ 
interests and leadership have gained increasing prominence. We suggest that 
existing optimistic expectations of participation inhibit acknowledgement of the 
troubling work of balancing power relations. Rather than denying such power 
relations, projects should be expected to plan for them.  
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Introduction  
 
Contemporary health policies prescribe community ownership and leadership 
as essential components of effective health promotion with marginalised 
groups. However, the positive language of participatory policies may not 
prepare community projects for the significant dilemmas and challenges which 
they encounter upon implementing participation. This paper focuses on the 
dilemma of the extent to which more powerful groups outside of the focal 
participating group may be permitted to exert influence over a project. By 
showing how the condition of marginality in fact forces participatory projects to 
involve and to adapt to more powerful groups, this paper aims to contribute a 
realistic conceptualisation of the scope for such projects to be genuinely 
‘community-led’. Our argument is made through a case study of a sex-worker-
led project based in Kolkata (Calcutta), India. To set the context for the case 
study, we briefly outline contemporary controversies over participation before 
describing current participatory health promotion for sex workers in India. 
 
The disputed role of community participation 
 
At its inception, community participation as an approach to health and 
development projects was framed as a critical counter to the power 
inequalities of the ‘top-down’ imposition of development programmes. Thus, 
for instance, the World Bank’s (1997) Participation Sourcebook explained its 
new ‘participatory stance’ by contrast to the old ‘external expert stance’. 
Based on important critiques of an undemocratic and unequal development 
process which had often produced locally unpopular and thus ineffective 
projects, the involvement of local people was intended to produce better-
designed projects that had the endorsement of local communities, through an 
egalitarian and democratic process (Asthana & Oostvogels, 1996; Nelson & 
Wright, 1995). An optimistic, even utopian discourse ensued (Henkel & Stirrat, 
2001), in which the ‘last’ would be ‘put first’ (Chambers, 1983), development 
would be ‘people-centred’ (Korten, 1990), and communities, which were 
presumed homogenous, would be engaged. With such positive connotations, 
the mainstreaming of participation was perhaps inevitable. Its positive ideals 
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have been written into the policies of funding agencies, and applicants have 
learnt to describe their projects in the appropriate terms of community 
engagement, empowerment and participation.  
 
At the same time, however, research on the implementation of participation 
began to show significant gaps between the rhetoric and the reality, leading to 
a perspective which is strongly critical of participation. Time and again, 
research on ostensibly participatory projects has revealed that groups who 
wield greatest power – including the state, development professionals, and 
local elites – continue to dominate (Shiffman, 2002; Stern & Green, 2005). At 
the outset, projects are usually committed by funding constraints to a non-
negotiable remit, such as HIV prevention, irrespective of local priorities 
(Mohan, 2001). Further, the activities comprising ‘participation’ are generally 
designed by external professionals, who thereby structure the interactions that 
take place and the results that emerge (Mosse, 2001). And rather than 
communities uniting for the collective benefit, critics show that it is those who 
are already relatively powerful who take advantage of the opportunities 
offered by participation (Beall, 1997), or that they even obstruct the 
participation of the least powerful in order to maintain their dominance (Busza, 
2004). In this light, the prospects for genuine community leadership seem 
dismal, and the notion of participation appears as a misleading ‘tyranny’ 
(Cooke & Kothari, 2001).  
 
But to reject participation on these grounds is to accept the terms of the 
idealised view of participation outlined above, where to be tainted by power 
relations constitutes a failure. In this paper, we seek to contribute to an 
emerging, more nuanced perspective. By placing participatory projects in their 
wider sociohistorical contexts of inequalities of power, authors in this literature 
make explicable the failures to meet participatory ideals, but also reveal the 
successes that imperfectly participatory projects can achieve. For instance, 
studying a participatory agricultural project, Kumar and Corbridge (2002) point 
out that, although the project’s participatory credentials were undermined by 
the fact that it was the high status villagers who benefited most, the project 
was successful in terms of its agricultural goals. The authors argue that a 
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participatory project is a relatively small scale intervention into a long history 
of social stratification, and that we should not expect participatory projects to 
change entrenched power relations. Such expectations, they argue, are 
unrealistic. From a similar, but slightly more optimistic perspective, Masaki 
(2004) argues that the degree of success of such projects is often an 
equivocal issue, as they may enable small-scale resistance by those with less 
power even if they do not instigate fundamental change to power relations.  
 
The core issue here lies in the juxtaposition of a long history of inequality with 
a recent, resource-limited participatory intervention. In a study of participatory 
HIV prevention by South African sex workers, Campbell and Mzaidume 
(2001) point out that while ‘textbook’ concepts of participation advocate that 
interventions should build on existing supportive relationships of trust and 
reciprocity, the existing relationships in their marginalised community were 
exploitative and conflictual rather than trusting or supportive. To develop 
informed foundations for action in such contexts, the authors call for research 
which investigates the “complexities and ambiguities involved in translating 
theoretically and politically important notions of participatory health promotion 
into practice in hard-to-reach communities” (2001, p.1986). The present paper 
aims to contribute to this agenda. 
 
In sum, the ‘nuanced’ literature asserts that existing power relations are 
reflected in participatory projects, but that significant successes are possible 
even if the ideals of participation are compromised. In the course of our case 
study, we shall suggest not only that collusion with powerful interest groups 
can be compatible with achieving health gain, but that it can be necessary, 
when those interest groups have the power to put a stop to a project.  
 
Conceptual approach: Interdependencies between unequals  
 
Dominant conceptualisations of community may bear some of the 
responsibility for the polarised interpretations of community participation 
outlined above. While the conceptual debate is often posed as being between 
‘locational’ definitions of community, based in a geographical place, and 
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‘relational’ definitions, based on shared identities or interests (Heller, 1989), 
both definitions are fundamentally similar in that they are based on similarity 
or homogeneity among community members. The boundary of the community 
is drawn around people who are expected to be equals. Bringing this notion to 
community health promotion may suggest that the marginalised ‘target’ group 
is the community, and that they should participate together as a set of equals. 
 
In contrast, we take a systemic perspective, where a community is defined by 
interdependencies rather than likeness (Marková, 2003). What holds 
community members together is not simply the fact that they live in the same 
locality, nor that they necessarily share an identity, nor that they are equals, 
but that they are part of an interdependent system in which their actions have 
effects on each other by virtue of their participation in a joint activity (van 
Vlaenderen, 2001). Thus, the membership of a community includes people 
with divergent and even conflicting interests, worldviews, and identities 
(Wiesenfeld, 1996). 
 
From this perspective, the boundaries of the community in a community 
health project include all of the actors who take part in shaping the project, 
including members of the marginalised social group, health and development 
professionals, and other local interest groups. A community intervention is an 
intervention into this structured ecology of power relations. Our empirical 
research thus focuses on the interdependencies between the sex workers in 
the Sonagachi Project and other local actors, to ask: What has the 
relationship been between the Sonagachi Project and other powerful interest 
groups? And what does this say about the prospects for interventions to be 
truly ‘community-led’?  
 
Community-led HIV prevention for Indian sex workers 
 
Interventions with sex workers are a cornerstone of India’s response to the 
HIV pandemic, given that the majority of HIV infections are thought to be 
acquired through unprotected heterosexual intercourse, and that traditionally, 
few Indian women other than sex workers have opportunities to have multiple 
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sexual partners (Nagelkerke et al., 2002). The active involvement of sex 
workers is widely considered a necessary component of such interventions 
(Chattopadhyay & McKaig, 2004; O’Neil, Orchard, Swarankar, Blanchard, 
Gaurav & Moses, 2004). Peer education, which involves sex workers by 
training and employing them to promote health, is one of the most common 
approaches (Dandona et al., 2005). At a more politicised level of involvement, 
a relatively strong sex workers’ rights movement has emerged, which 
advocates that sex workers should be the leaders and decision-makers on 
health projects, and which also pursues legislative and social change 
(Jayasree, 2004). Some of these organisations have been facilitated by the 
availability of HIV/AIDS funding.  
 
One of the best known of these community-led endeavours is the Sonagachi 
Project in Kolkata, which provides our empirical case study for this paper. The 
Project began in Sonagachi, Kolkata’s largest red light district, where an 
estimated 5,000, mainly female, sex workers live and work. Economic poverty 
and social stigma characterize most sex workers’ lives. Their working 
conditions are controlled by brothel managers (madams), pimps and local 
men’s social clubs. In these unpromising conditions, the Sonagachi Project 
was initiated, with an HIV prevention remit, in 1992. 
 
Peer education was the initial activity of the Project. As it developed, a second 
wing emerged, which works on community development, intervening to 
resolve crises and conflicts faced by sex workers, such as disputes with 
madams, arrests by police, or violent clients. Project documentation describes 
its philosophy in terms of “3 R’s: Respect, Recognition and Reliance. That is 
respect of sex workers and their profession; recognising their profession, and 
their rights; and reliance on their understanding and capability” (Jana & 
Banerjee, 1999, p.11). Following this philosophy, the frontline posts in the 
project are staffed by sex workers, and sex workers increasingly occupy the 
administrative and decision-making roles. The community development work 
is done through elected local problem-solving committees composed of 
women from the red light district. A sex workers’ organisation, Durbar Mahila 
Samanwaya Committee (DMSC, which roughly translates as ‘Unstoppable 
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Women’s United Committee) has been set up, which organises weekly and 
monthly problem-solving meetings, and promotes sex workers’ social and 
political awareness through critical discussions of the stigma attached to sex 
work, and the value of collective action (Cornish, 2006).  
 
This innovative set of activities has effectively improved health. In Sonagachi 
red light district, an internal evaluation showed condom use to have increased 
dramatically, and sexually transmitted infections to have plummeted (Jana & 
Banerjee, 1999). A recent 2-community controlled trial replicating the 
Sonagachi model outside Kolkata showed that condom use increased 
significantly in the intervention site (Basu et al, 2004). In sum, as has been 
described elsewhere (Basu et al., 2004; Gooptu, 2002; Jana, Basu, 
Rotheram-Borus & Newman, 2004; Pardasani, 2005), the Project is a strong 
example of a community-led project, which is successful in terms of health 
promotion, community mobilization, and sustainability, having run for 14 
years. Our argument in this paper is that this success is, in part, due to the 
Project’s subtle management of its relations with the non-sex-worker groups 
with which it must engage.  
 
Methods  
 
The Sonagachi Project’s relationships with other powerful actors is one aspect 
of a larger study which aimed to understand how the Project achieves its 
successes. Ethnographic research, comprising observation and interviews 
was carried out at the Project during May 2000, June-December 2001, 
September 2002, and July 2005. This paper draws on interviews with 19 sex 
workers employed by the Project, 7 non-sex-worker professional staff, and 13 
other local people (landladies, madams, sex workers’ clients, a political party 
worker). Informal discussions with representatives of funding agencies and 
staff of other NGOs are also drawn upon. In interviews, we asked participants 
about the social organisation of the red light district, and their knowledge of 
and involvement in the Project.  
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From June to December 2001, we observed Project activities. We 
accompanied Project workers as they went about their daily routine, attending 
training sessions, peer education work, the Project’s clinics, and its problem-
solving meetings. These events also provided occasions for informal 
interviews with a range of local residents. We attended public events 
organised by the Project including demonstrations and rallies in the city, press 
conferences, meetings with other NGOs, with police and with local men’s 
clubs. Our observations were guided by our interest in understanding the 
social organisation of the red light district, and how the Sonagachi Project fits 
in to, or disrupts that social organisation.  
 
Observations and interviews were carried out jointly by the authors, one a 
European university-based researcher, and the other a local Bengali 
researcher, both women. Project activities often include an audience of sex 
workers and other community members, which we joined as non-participant 
observers. We were introduced to participants as people who were studying 
the Project and who were going to write about it. Being well-known, the 
Project regularly welcomes sympathetic visitors such as journalists, 
researchers or development workers, who come to learn from the Project. 
This role made sense to Project workers, who accepted our presence.  
 
The interpretation developed here has been shaped by the authors’ differing 
intellectual and socio-cultural heritages. This interpretation depends upon 
recognising both the achievements of the Sonagachi Project, and its 
significant compromises. Our personal backgrounds led each of us to initially 
emphasise one of these perspectives. The European researcher (FC) started 
from the perspective that participation is difficult to achieve, and that the 
Sonagachi Project was an unusual example of a successful sex-worker-led 
project. The Bengali researcher (RG), with more practical experience of the 
constraints of working in red light districts and of NGOs’ self-publicising, as 
well as awareness of local controversies over the Sonagachi Project, started 
from a more sceptical perspective. These different perspectives led us to long 
debates over the interpretation of the Project’s relation with other groups, 
whose eventual outcome is presented here.  
 9 
 
The analysis focuses upon the Project’s interdependencies with four key 
groups of non-sex-workers: (1) the local men’s clubs which have traditionally 
controlled the red light district; (2) the madams who are sex workers’ 
employers; (3) the health and development professionals who founded and 
implement the Project; and (4) the Project’s donors. Other relevant social 
groups such as police, procurers, sex workers’ families, boyfriends and 
clients, are omitted from the present analysis because their influence on the 
Project is less significant.  
 
Our analysis aims to understand the logic of the system of interdependencies 
between these groups and the Project. In order to do so, our analytical 
strategy followed three steps for each group: (1) To identify the divergences 
and convergences of interest between the sex workers and others; (2) To 
identify cases where those divergences significantly threatened the Project’s 
continued existence; (3) To identify the Project’s active responses to 
challenges raised by non-sex-workers. We present the Project’s relation with 
each of the four groups in turn.  
 
Relations with local clubs  
 
The Sonagachi Project is not the only group seeking to provide organisation 
and orderliness in Kolkata’s red light districts. In many areas, local men’s 
social clubs have traditionally occupied a leadership role. These clubs draw 
their membership from the men of the red light area, who are often the 
unemployed sons of sex workers. The clubs are centres of social activity for 
the men, they organise local events such as festival celebrations, and they 
see themselves as protecting the orderliness of their local area. Each club is 
associated with a political party, which gives them power in the red light 
district. Local men associated with these clubs are often feared by sex 
workers. Bolstered by their association with political parties and clubs, these 
men are reported to exploit sex workers, stealing from them or physically or 
sexually abusing them. As self-appointed guardians of the social order, they 
may consider sex workers to be threats to this order, punishing them for 
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wearing flowers in their hair or for going out late at night. They monitor all the 
local goings-on, and may demand money in return for not raising objections to 
events such as a sex worker buying a house, or a madam keeping a minor girl 
in her brothel. In return for winning votes for their associated political parties, 
the clubs gain political clout, which can be put to work for individual sex 
workers or madams, for a fee. Sex workers value club or party support, which 
has, for instance, enabled women to get ration cards (which provide access to 
government-subsidised food), or provided strong-arm back-up in the event of 
a dispute with a client or landlady. However, this system of problem-solving 
institutionalises divisions between local residents, and gives the men power 
over the sex workers.    
 
What kind of relationship has the Sonagachi Project cultivated with these 
clubs? From the beginning, the Project’s founder aimed to ensure good 
relationships with the clubs, as they could either create obstacles to the 
Project’s work, or could offer useful support. He sought to make it clear that 
the Project had no interest in changing the organisation of the sex trade, but 
rather, had a narrow health promotion remit. In presenting themselves to the 
clubs, Project workers assert that the Project has no political affiliation and no 
interest in influencing sex workers’ votes. Special meetings are held with club 
members to promote good public relations, informing them about Project 
activities and asking for their support, where the club members are treated 
with respect and given small gifts such as stationery or calendars.   
 
In general, this negotiation has led to a co-operative interdependency 
between the Project and the clubs. In two intervention areas, the Project uses 
premises that belong to the clubs for its clinics. Project workers explained that 
the clubs benefit from this arrangement by having their buildings upgraded 
and maintained by the Project. The clubs also gain positive publicity, by 
showing that they support good causes, and moreover, they expect to be able 
to influence decisions about who gets employment in the Project. The 
availability of these premises was clearly of significant benefit to the Project, 
given the scarcity of resources available. But the arrangement also gives the 
clubs leverage over the Project, as they control a resource of importance to it.  
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Project workers claimed in 2005 that, recently, the clubs have been raising 
obstacles. Simple requests, such as permission to erect a temporary tent for a 
health event have been turned down. It appears that the Project’s gradual 
empowerment of sex workers has started to challenge the clubs. Given that 
the Project has developed an effective problem-solving mechanism, sex 
workers are now less reliant on clubs for support, and, having become more 
politically aware, they may be less inclined to vote as instructed by the clubs. 
As the project wins increased public support and funding, it is starting to 
purchase its own premises, moving towards greater long-term security and 
reducing its dependence upon the clubs. The Project has been given 
municipal land for the construction of a hospital. In 2005, this land was 
occupied by tea-sellers, who would have to be evicted in order to begin 
construction. But the local party refused to permit the eviction of the tea-
sellers. Project workers will tread carefully, to try to avoid the significant 
disruption that the clubs may create.  
 
Due to the existing power structure of the red light district, the Project has had 
to compromise its participatory ideals, engaging with the clubs, and using 
some of its limited resources to curry favour with them (see also Campbell & 
Mzaidume, 2001). But as time goes on and the Project gains in strength, it 
gains greater autonomy. As the Project director explains, the very fact that the 
clubs are now motivated to raise obstacles indicates that the Project must 
indeed be challenging their power sufficiently to cause them some discomfort.  
 
Relations with madams 
 
Madams own or rent the rooms within which sex workers live and work, 
provide them with meals, exert control over their working conditions, and 
receive a fixed 50% of their earnings. With sex workers, madams share an 
economic interest in the sale of sex taking place without trouble being caused 
by clients, police or local clubs. However, sex workers’ interests in their health 
and autonomy can conflict with madams’ economic logic that the more clients 
entertained, the greater the income, regardless of whether condoms are used, 
 12 
or the client is drunk and abusive, or the sex worker is tired, ill or unwilling. 
Some madams use punishments and threats, such as violence or preventing 
a woman from working, to enforce their control. 
 
On the other hand, the madam system has some advantages, given the 
dangerous and impoverished conditions of the red light district. For those 
women whose earnings are insufficient to pay the deposit to rent a room, or 
not regular enough to guarantee that she will be able to meet daily expenses, 
the madam system offers basic material security. For those unfamiliar with the 
sex trade or without alternative support, madams can offer physical security, 
protecting women from abusive clients, or from running into difficulties with 
police or local residents. This is not to deny that exploitation, violence and 
brutality often characterise the relations between madams and sex workers, 
but to add that these relations have positive as well as negative aspects 
(Gysels, Pool & Bwanika, 2001).  
  
What of the relation between madams and the Sonagachi Project? In fact, 
madams are integrally involved, particularly in the local problem-solving 
meetings. Madams bring their problems, such as a sex worker not repaying a 
debt or running away, to meetings for solution. Several of the local 
committees include madams as their members, who thus have influence over 
the solutions generated. Is this not counter to the ideals of sex worker 
leadership? At face value, it is. But there are good reasons for the madams’ 
presence on the committees. Sex workers’ marginalised starting position 
severely undermines their capacity to be effective committee members. 
Firstly, sex workers have not been considered, in the red light district, to have 
the legitimacy to take a decision and enforce it, whereas the voices of 
madams typically carry more power. Secondly, sex workers are relatively 
mobile compared to madams, and some stability is important for the 
committees to develop. And finally, as one professional social worker pointed 
out to us, if the madams are excluded from the Project, an opportunity to 
influence them is lost. Madams are not immune from repression themselves, 
and as the Project has gained influence in the red light area, it has become of 
interest to madams as a source of support. Now, it can set conditions for 
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madams’ eligibility to access its support. So, madams who want support must 
allow their employees to visit the clinic, must pay them fairly, and must not 
keep minor girls. The value of creating such interdependencies with madams 
is further affirmed by the notable absence of the most elite group of 
Sonagachi’s madams (the Agrawalis) from the Project. Financially well off and 
politically well-connected, the Project’s assistance is not a sufficient incentive 
to motivate the Agrawali madams’ co-operation and thus the Project has little 
influence over them.  
 
Given the control that madams have over the sex workers, this compromise of 
the ideal of sex worker leadership has been necessary for the sustainability of 
the Project. If the Project angers the madams, they can close their doors to 
the Project workers. This was demonstrated clearly at the introduction, in 
2001, of a Project programme to rescue minor girls and trafficked women. In 
response to Project workers rescuing a badly tortured sex worker from a 
madam, the other local madams subsequently refused to allow the Project’s 
peer educators to speak to their sex workers, effectively shutting the Project 
out of the red light district.  
 
The madams’ influence is constrained, however, both by established norms of 
the red light district, and by procedural rules developed within the Sonagachi 
Project. A strong set of norms regarding the sale of sex in Sonagachi provide 
committees with a benchmark for what is fair and acceptable. For instance, 
the rule that sex workers and madams divide the income between them 
equally is considered a legitimate division. If a sex worker has been paid less 
than this, a madam will be considered to have wronged her, and will be asked 
to pay the balance. Conversely, if a sex worker has withheld some of the 
madam’s portion, she will be expected to repay the madam. This rule enables 
the Project to ensure that sex workers are paid their 50%, but the rule itself is 
rarely challenged. As well as such pre-existing rules, within the Project, a set 
of procedures have been established, designed to prevent the interests of the 
powerful from dominating the meetings. These procedures include the idea 
that both sides of an argument must be heard, and that decisions should be 
based on evidence and witnesses rather than mere allegation or hearsay. 
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Most important is the fact that important decisions are generated not by 
individual madams or sex workers, but in public meetings, attended by sex 
workers and Project workers, who ensure that the committee members are 
not simply protecting their own interests or those of their friends.  
 
In sum, in order to be allowed access to sex workers, the Project has had to 
engage madams’ support. This has sometimes enabled the madams to 
pursue their own interests. But the Project exerts increasing influence on the 
madams, through conditions for the provision of its support and through its 
procedures.  
 
Relations with health and development professionals 
 
While the design and implementation of Project activities depend heavily on 
sex workers’ contributions, it is fair to say that the Project would not exist 
without the significant input of non-sex-workers, including health 
professionals, social workers, and community development activists. Several 
years prior to the Project’s initiation, a group of sex workers in Sonagachi had 
come together with the aim of collectively addressing the violence and 
exploitation which they suffered. They achieved some successes, but were 
unable to maintain the group, which disintegrated after some time. In 1992, 
the WHO appointed a local epidemiologist to run an HIV prevention 
intervention in Sonagachi. He had clinical knowledge, organisational skills, 
political know-how and connections, which the earlier grouping of sex workers 
lacked, and which proved essential to the establishment of the Project.  
 
While sex workers provided much of the expert knowledge about the workings 
of the red light district and their own needs, they had very little in the way of 
project management skills, familiarity with the workings of funding agencies, 
or indeed legitimacy in the eyes of the local power-brokers such as madams, 
procurers, and police whose approval had to be secured for the Project to 
exist. The activists, academics and NGO workers employed by the Project 
were able to mediate between funding agencies and sex workers, 
constructing funding proposals and setting up mechanisms to document the 
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work and ensure accountability. Their experience was also used to set up the 
organisational structure and procedures of the Project. Tried and tested 
organisational tools such as elected committees, regular public meetings, and 
clear differentiation of roles, enable the co-ordination of the large numbers of 
people involved in the project. Few sex workers had knowledge or experience 
of such tools before the Project began. And finally, the professionals had a 
perceived legitimacy and power denied to the sex workers, in the eyes of the 
powerful actors in the red light area – the club members, procurers, madams, 
pimps and police. Without the leadership of these professionals in this 
‘community-led’ project, it is likely that the Project would have failed, as had 
the earlier attempt.  
 
What is the nature of non-sex-worker professionals’ current engagement with 
the sex worker members? The organisational culture of the Project is a 
distinctive mix of centralised control and advocacy of sex worker leadership. 
Given the scarcity of project management and implementation skills, the 
Project was set up with a hierarchical organisation, with frontline workers 
reporting to co-ordinators who report to the Project Director. As previously 
mentioned, sex workers are increasingly taking on supervisory and leadership 
roles. In 1999, responsibility for the management of the Project was turned 
over to DMSC, the sex workers’ organisation. In 2001, a new Project Director 
was appointed, a local son of a sex worker, and the original Project Director 
left the Project, retaining an advisory role. Meanwhile, the Project endorsed a 
new policy, that the subsequent Director would be “from the community” (in 
the words of one non-sex-worker employee), i.e. a sex worker. In November 
2005, a former sex worker was appointed Project Director. In general, despite 
changes in personnel, the hierarchical organisation persists. While frontline 
workers are encouraged to solve problems themselves as far as possible, 
novel or complex problems are often brought to the current or former Project 
Directors, with the expectation that an authoritative solution will be provided. 
The Directors’ voices carry authority, and Project workers are very concerned 
not to invite their disapproval. The Directors also have a strong influence over 
many of the important decisions such as appointment and promotion of 
workers, and activities to be undertaken. 
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Is this substantial role for the non-sex-worker Project Directors not 
contradictory to the stated ideal of being ‘community led’? Again, it is 
contradictory, but we would argue, it is necessarily so. The pre-existing state 
of community relations in Sonagachi was not a level playing field. Had the 
Project opened up its decision-making to local control, it is likely that it would 
have been the madams or pimps or club members who capitalised on it, 
rather than the sex workers, and the Project would have become another 
example of participatory projects being taken over by the already powerful. 
The watchful eyes of the Directors prevent the madams on the Project’s 
committees from enforcing their individual interests, while sex workers’ 
capacity to take on administrative roles is built up.  
 
The role of activists and health professionals in participatory projects is a 
complex issue (Campbell, 2003). While it may be ideal that the community 
takes over the running of a participatory project, such work depends upon 
significant skills and powers, which cannot be assumed to exist in historically 
marginalised communities (Lykes, Terre Blanche & Hamber, 2003). Indeed, 
some studies have linked the demise of participatory HIV prevention projects 
to the withdrawal of institutional or professional support (Asthana & 
Oostvogels, 1996; Walden, Mwangulube & Makhumala-Nkhoma, 1999).  
 
 
Relations with funding agencies  
 
The final non-sex-worker interest group to be considered here comprises the 
funding agencies which make possible the staffing and resourcing of the 
clinics, offices, and activities that make up the Project. As an economically 
impoverished group, sex workers depend upon the financial input of funding 
agencies for their Project to exist. The competitive and insecure funding 
environment means that Project activities are oriented to funding agencies as 
one of their important audiences.  
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Fortunately for the Project, the interests of funding agencies coincide with 
those of the Project in important ways. They share an interest in producing an 
effective, sustainable project through participatory means. The liberal 
democratic ethos of their donors, and the contemporary policy emphasis on 
community participation in development, mean that the funding agencies are 
supportive of sex workers’ active participation and leadership of the Project. A 
sex worker told us how impressed she was that staff at one of the local 
funding agencies encourage the Project to send sex workers rather than 
health professionals as its representatives in funding agency meetings.  
 
Participation of sex workers in Project implementation, however, is not 
equivalent to sex workers leading in terms of setting priorities. There is some 
divergence between funding agencies and sex workers regarding the relative 
priority given to HIV prevention and to general community development. 
Health outcomes are the main focus of the Project’s donors, while sex 
workers often place a greater priority on the Project’s community development 
work. An external evaluation expressed the donor perspective on this 
discrepancy, when it commented that the Project’s attention to wider issues of 
social justice and quality of life were to be commended, but that “care should 
be taken not to lose sight of the original primary objectives of HIV prevention” 
(O’Reilly, Mertens, Sethi, Bhutani & Bandyopadhyay, 1996, p.2). A focus on 
HIV prevention derives from a public health interest in commercial sex work 
as a risky site for HIV transmission, which is not equivalent to the sex workers’ 
interest in having more secure and stable living and working conditions.  
 
The donors’ interest in a sustainable and effective project leads them to 
require detailed documentation and monitoring of Project expenditure and 
activities. Much energy goes into writing up regular plans and reports on all 
activities, including photographic and video documentation. Meticulous 
financial accounts must be kept, as well as records of the numbers of people 
treated at the clinic, numbers of condoms distributed, numbers of 
prescriptions given out, and so on. The clinic supplies, such as condoms, 
medical gloves, medicines, have to be counted and re-counted at each stage 
of their distribution, from arriving in the central office, to the clinic, to their use 
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or distribution. As well as such official accountability requirements, the Project 
also puts work into impressing the agencies through public relations efforts 
which are targeted at the mass media, or at the funding agencies themselves. 
A concept of ‘publicity’ contributes to shaping some of the Project’s actions. 
For instance, when the Project undertook to rescue minor girls from their 
madams, Project leaders mentioned that photographs should be taken of the 
girls who are rescued for the purposes of publicity.  
 
Project workers are aware that, when speaking to journalists, researchers, or 
representatives of funding agencies, they are creating impressions about the 
Project which may have an impact on funding agencies’ willingness to fund 
the Project. To meet funding agencies’ expectations of a successful and 
fundable project, the Project’s self-descriptions emphasise their successes in 
HIV prevention and their conformity to participatory ideals. This makes it 
difficult for discussions about the Project to include reflections on the 
dilemmas and compromises that Project workers have faced over the years. 
Some of the documents produced by the Project do indeed report the 
negotiations with the clubs and madams and the directive role played by the 
non-sex-worker founders of the Project (Jana & Banerjee, 1999), but these 
have not become part of the public story of the Sonagachi Project. Since the 
original premise for the first author’s research had been that this was a 
successful, participatory project, she also began by focusing on the positive 
participatory achievements rather than on the more complex issues 
concerning the Project’s interdependencies with other groups. The more 
sceptical second author emphasised the Project’s adjustments to the interests 
of non-sex-worker groups. As the analysis developed, it became clear that it 
was impossible to extricate the sex workers from the unequal social 
relationships and flows of resources within which they were embedded. We 
contend that researchers’ and funding agencies’ preconceptions about the 
character of a proper participatory project have made it difficult to recognise 
and reflect on the complex challenges and real-world dilemmas, thus 
hindering the development of a more nuanced theorisation of participation.  
 
 19 
Conclusions  
 
In this paper, we have examined the involvement of non-sex-workers in the 
‘community-led’ Sonagachi Project. We have done so with the aim of 
understanding the prospects for interventions to be genuinely led by the 
interests of marginalised groups. Our analysis has shown that the Project is 
driven, not simply by the community of sex workers, but by a complex set of 
negotiations between sex workers, local clubs, madams, professionals and 
funding agencies. The interests of powerful local men and madams are 
accommodated by the Project. Funding agencies and health professionals 
have directive influence over the activities undertaken. How should we 
interpret these contradictions of a ‘community-led’ project?  
 
We contend that, had the Project Director not occupied an authoritative role 
(in order to counter the power of sex workers’ adversaries), and had the 
Project not negotiated carefully with club members and madams, it would not 
have survived and succeeded for 14 years. The ideals of community 
leadership and participation are premised upon democratic and egalitarian 
principles, and focus on the members of the marginalised ‘target’ group as the 
participants. We have shown that the existing ecology of powers in a 
historically marginalised community holds the marginalised group in a 
fractured and unequal set of interdependencies. In such instances, we have 
argued, the contradiction of involving more powerful others is necessary to the 
extent that those others either have the power to put a stop to the project, or 
can offer it support without which it would fail. Ideally, as the participatory 
project develops capacity, independence from those other groups grows.  
 
Over the course of its 14 years, the Sonagachi Project has empowered many 
sex workers with new skills, confidence and legitimacy, to contribute to Project 
decision-making meetings, to take and enforce decisions, and to represent 
the Project to police, politicians and the media. It has also gained increasing 
influence over the other powerful actors in the red light district. Thus, rather 
than criticising the practices of the Sonagachi Project for not meeting the lofty 
aims of pure sex worker leadership, we contend that it is the development 
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discourse that promotes unrealistic criteria for participatory projects that is 
worthy of criticism. 
 
What are the practical implications of our study? If we have suggested that 
collusion is near inevitable, does this mean that it is not to be critiqued? Our 
intention is quite the opposite. We hope that our case study may facilitate a 
critical awareness among practitioners, evaluators and policy-makers of the 
dilemmas of intervention in settings characterised by power inequalities, 
because those power inequalities can be actively managed. Firstly, it is clear 
that very substantial efforts and a long timeframe are required to build 
participants’ capacities for activities such as demonstrating accountability to 
funding agencies, managing a large organisation, or negotiating with the 
powerful groups that might raise obstacles to a project. Secondly, the 
planning of a participatory project should include explicit consideration of how 
relationships with potential adversaries are to be managed, rather than 
denying their existence. Thirdly, project designs should provide for 
opportunities to monitor and critically reflect on the nature of the project’s 
engagement with powerful groups. Reflection is no guarantee against 
exploitation, but it is an advance on denial. For project evaluators, we suggest 
that projects should not be judged by idealised standards of community 
leadership, but by whether practical steps to actively manage, monitor and 
change relationships with powerful groups have been taken. 
 
Finally, we turn to the implications for funding agency policy. Funding 
agencies should understand the constraints which their ideals exert on how 
those applying for or receiving funding can describe their project. There is a 
danger that, in setting high standards of participatory excellence to be aspired 
to, funding policies suggest that anything less is unacceptable, thus 
discouraging project workers from recognising and reflecting on the 
compromises and dilemmas that they encounter. Perhaps donors could start 
to expect projects to be embroiled in dilemmas and compromises. From this 
point of view, a project describing itself in wholly positive participatory terms 
sounds unrealistic rather than admirable. Projects could be asked to include in 
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their funding proposals a consideration of how they are going to manage the 
more powerful groups who may resist their empowerment efforts.  
  
Our interpretation also has implications for the contemporary controversy over 
the requirement of one funding body, USAID, that, in order to be eligible for 
funding, HIV/AIDS projects “must have a policy explicitly opposing 
prostitution” (USAID, 2005, p.7). This requirement is based on a principled 
opposition to the sale of sex. From the systemic point of view that we have 
taken, if an organisation were to wholly oppose the existence of the sex trade, 
and thus to attack the power base of local power-brokers, those groups would 
often be powerful enough to call a halt to the project. Had the founders of the 
Sonagachi Project opposed the existence of the sex trade at the outset, they 
would not have been permitted access to the sex workers. In such instances, 
opposing prostitution is not compatible with gaining access to the red light 
district, and, thus does not reflect a realistic assessment of the ecology of 
social relations through which marginalisation and social change or social 
stasis are constituted. Both the position that marginalised community 
members should be the leaders of community health projects, and the 
position that the sale of sex should not exist, imply forms of social 
organisation unfamiliar in contemporary impoverished and marginalised 
communities. The position that community health interventions in 
marginalised settings are likely to be involved in collusive and compromising 
relations is a more realistic perspective, one that yields the challenging task of 
continually and critically monitoring those relations. 
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